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At the time of the Nazi occupation, the Dutch Catholic press was among the world's best, especially for a nominally Protestant country. Many daily and weekly publications had only local circulation, but there were a few larger ones like De Tijd and De Volkskrant of Amsterdam and De Gelderlander of Nijmegen. Titus had hoped to see a large, national Catholic paper and had worked to establish one . He had written to his family that "outside of the Churches themselves, the press is the first pulpit of Catholic thought; it not only responds to those who cry out against us, but proclaims the truth day after day".[35] Until this point, the Catholic papers had successfully ignored all attempts on the part of the N.S.B. to have articles or advertisements printed. The pressure on the editors had steadily increased, however, and Titus told Archbishop de Jong of their plight as early as September 1940. Rost van Tonningen, now head of the Netherlands Information Department, soothingly promised the editors that there would be no attack on liberty of conscience, but they remained suspicious. [36] Dr. Bodewes, director of De Gelderlander, was rebuked for refusing an N.S.B. advertisement. In response, he went to the Hague in person and offered to resign immediately -- the government quickly backed down when it appeared that the incident might cause too much excitement. [37] Then on December 18, 1941, the Ministry informed the press by Telex (and therefore unofficially) that it was forbidden to refuse N.S.B. announcements on grounds of principle. But while the ministry thought of "principal" as ideology, the Catholic journalists understood it more in terms of faith and morals". Titus saw this development as the point at which he had to take a personal stand. [38] Two large papers, De Moasbode and Ons Noorden, had already been banned at the end of 1940 for printing the bishops' pastoral letter. De Tijd was able to continue, but under restrictions. Brandsma was convinced by these events that the clergy had to help the laymen carry their increasingly difficult burden, regardless of the consequences. [39] On the morning of December 30, he consulted the Archbishop and was warned against rash action, "They'll find it easier to arrest you than me." But Titus insisted, "I can act more easily than you: I can travel, advise, and evoke a kind of fidelity that may astound everyone." [40] He met with the editors of De Gelderlander and the suppressed Maasbode, who held the same position as he did. Surprisingly, they were not discouraged. Yet because they mistrusted some of the other editors, they doubted that a united front was possible. [41] After this meeting, Titus wrote a circular letter to all Catholic journalists. As one of the pivotal documents of his life, this circular of December 31, 1941 shows much of his innermost character. He grants the rights of the occupation forces according to Dutch and international law. But he quickly adds that the N.S.B. has attacked Catholic dogmas, and has proclaimed ideas contrary to religion itself. The pressure on the press was such that readers are no longer sure whether they are reading Catholic papers or not. It is often difficult to know at what point one must resist. [42] The hour is past when there can't be any turning back by the Catholic press. They would be disobedient to their archbishop and to their conscience, should they give their support to these ideas and to this movement. This instruction [the Telex messagej is not yet official. Perhaps it will not become so . . . But if that order is given, even under the threat of grave penalties such as the suspension or the suppression of a paper, the publishers and editors must categorically refuse the articles imposed . It is not possible to act otherwise . The bounds have been passed . . . The more we are united in this refusal, the stronger we shall be. ( . . . . ) I only write this declaration after mature reflection, after discussion with various people in authority, and with his excellency the Archbishop . . . It will be very hard for many of you who will be losing your daily bread . Only those who try and force your consciences will bear the responsibility . . . I do not yet dare to think that they will go as far as that, but if they do, God will have the last word, and will reward the faithful servant . [43] Titus had volunteered to assure support for the editors and publishers by both writing and visiting them, listening to their reactions. He spent the first ten days of 1942 travelling from one end of the Kingdom to the other. He visited the other 4 bishops, and 14 newspapers in 15 cities.[44] He was able to report to the Archbishop that not one of the editors was afraid to resist on principle, although some had requested clear and uncompromising orders from the bishops as a sort of protective shield . De Jong agreed to issue such directives, and again urged caution. Titus replied that it simply would not be right to send his friends into the front lines while he moved safely to the rear. [45] Not surprisingly, the police noticed this flurry of activity, although they were not sure exactly what was happening at first. The S.D. eventually reported to Berlin that the Catholic press was fighting back, and specifically mentioned Brandsma's action as "sabotage. [46] The bishops had decided that their letter condemning the order of December 18 would not be published unless necessary. But on January 15, de Jong received word from the Utrechtsche Courant that the N.S.B. had demanded publication of a particularly striking ad in three editions of the Neerlandia Pers. Deciding that the crisis point had been reached, the bishops ordered that their letter be released to 17 papers and published the following day. [47] The letter ended, "To reach a united front, the Episcopate will be happy to receive, by means of Fr. Titus Brandsma, a written declaration from publishers and chief editors stating their willingness to follow these guidelines of ours." A flood of letters to Nijmegen followed, although Titus was not there to see them. [48] On Monday, January 19, an S.D. official named Steffen arrested Titus and took him by train to the police prison at Scheveningen, the so-called "Oranje Hotel" because of the number of Dutch patriots being kept there. His interrogation began on January 20, the day of the Wannsee Conference, at which the "Final Solution" of the Jewish question would be decided . His interrogator was S.S. Hauptscharfuehrer Hardegen. Significantly, Hardegen belonged to Gruppe IV (Churches), rather than Gruppe III A 3 (Press), and had been ordered to take exclusive charge of the case. [49] Brandsma was very co-operative with the police, frequently telling them exactly what they wanted to hear. The Archbishop has told him to blame the bishops for everything; Titus did indeed state that he had acted as the bishops' agent, but added that his opinions were identical to theirs. He admitted promoting resistance to the press authorities and obedience to the bishops. "The Church remains strong because of sacrifices and martyrs." He insisted that the Church never wanted to force the conscience of anyone, but was simply remaining faithful to its basic principles. Any conflict was caused by government encroachment into the religious sphere, and not the opposite. Following the formal interrogation, Hardegen asked him to put in writing a clear statement why the Dutch people, particularly the Catholics, opposed the N.S.B. Titus wrote a clearly reasoned essay, stating why National Socialism is foreign, anti-religious, inhuman, and ultimately doomed to failure. In both origin and development, the N.S.B. is depicted as an anti-national force. Even if one grants that Hitler's own movement was molded by German forces which had never existed in the Netherlands, the Nazis ignore the best elements of German culture, as had been pointed out by Cardinal Faulhaber and Bishop Hugo of Mainz. "Nazism is based above all on philosophers and sociologists with neoHegelian ideas. It is a strongly idealistic system in which the race must gradually evolve in a biological and increasingly materialistic way." Therefore the N.S.B. is following the Germans in a superficial way, with no reference to the genuine historical character of the Dutch. Titus pointed out a few differences: higher Dutch birth rate and lower death rate, better housing and social insurance, greater agricultural yield, and the much higher productivity of Dutch industry, with little of the "negative' munitions manufacture common in Germany. (Although he had no study materials, Titus supports his argument by citing an article by Wolfgang B. von Lengercke in the latest issue of Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik.) He quotes an old Dutch proverb, "Not every change is an improvement", and ends with the 3 key reasons why the N.S.B. has no influence: "People feel that the elimination of religious influence is not only an affront to God in his dealings with his creatures, but also a violation of the glorious traditions of the Dutch people." The extreme arrogance and gross incompetence of the N.S.B. members assures their unpopularity, especially since they represent only 0.5% of the people. The N.S.B. has put itself at the mercy of the Germans in order to survive . Whatever autonomy they once had exists no longer. [50] In conclusion, he offers a short prayer. "God bless Holland, God bless Germany! God grant that these two people may soon stand again side by side in full liberty and peace, in full recognition of His glory for the good of two nations so closely related to one another." [51] Based on both oral and written statements, Hardegen drew several conclusions: Brandsma is genuinely a man of character with firm convictions. Hardegen decided to delay further action, pending more investigation of Brandsma's activity. [52] One of the Dutch prisoners at Scheveningen was a man named van Nieuwenhoven, who was entrusted with cleaning work in the corridors. He had known Fr. Brandsma in Nijmegen, and now looked after the physical needs of his old friend as far as he was able . He later reported hearing from S.D. agents Woysky and Horac that Titus could easily have been released if he had decided to surrender to Hardegen in principle. [53] The remainder of Titus Brandsma's life was marked by deteriorating health, but unflagging cheerfulness. He was moved to the transit labor camp at Amersfoort on March 12, then briefly returned to Scheveningen in May to be "evaluated" one final time by Hardegen. He was asked to sign a promise not to preach or resist the occupation forces, but his only response was to re-state the reasons why the Church opposed National Socialism . Thus his fate was sealed. [54] At this point, Himmler's headquarters in Berlin communicated the decision to send him to a camp in Germany. Ironically, the dysentery and cramps he had experienced at Amersfoort had caused his chronic bladder infection to disappear. The chaplain at his next stop, the "clearing house" prison at Kleve, was so alarmed at the state of his health that he suggested a request for better treatment. As a result, Titus wrote a letter on June 12, asking to be sent to the German Carmelite house at Bamberg. The request was never acted upon . He was sent to Dachau the following day. [55] Even at his final destination, Titus seems to have kept his courage and optimism. He was assigned to one of the 3 "clergy blocks" and received especially severe treatment. He met several Polish Carmelites there, as well as another Dutch Carmelite, Brother Raphael Tijhuis, who tried to protect him. In spite of repeated beatings, he never stopped trying to speak to the attendants and guards, to influence them or soften their attitudes. After one particularly cruel beating, he was taken to the infirmary. Since there was little chance that he could ever work again, he was considered an inconvenience to the medical staff. After suffering several days as a victim of "medical experiments", he was given a lethal injection and died July 26, 1942. [56] In the context of millions upon millions of deaths during World War II, whether on battlefields or in concentration camps, one may very well ask if the life and death of one individual really "meant" anything at all. For Titus Brandsma, resistance to injustice on principle was an easy development of his earlier life. A nation of individualists, like his own, could always resist a tyrant, but did so most effectively with good leadership. Both Protestant and Catholic Churches had provided such leadership from the very beginning. [57] Even today, Brandsma is considered one of the heroes of the national resistance at all levels of society. In his protest to Seyss-Inquart about discrimination in the schools, he proudly invoked the Dutch principle of equality before the law. As he refused to accept N.S.B. propaganda for the papers, he defended the principle of freedom of conscience which the Dutch have always valued so highly. By making such a refusal illegal on grounds of principle, the Nazis themselves had made the question one of a universal principle, as Titus was quick to point out in his letter. Journalists both in the Netherlands and in Italy revere his memory today for his courageous stand. [58] According to the N.S.B.'s own records, Titus was considered one of the most dangerous men in the country because of his work for the Catholic schools, his defense of the Jews, and his activity at the university. [59] Cardinal Alfrink referred to these records in a homily delivered 40 years later in Rome, (October 24, 1982): "". . . the occupation forces were afraid of the authority, the firm character, and the power of persuasion of Fr. Brandsma, traits which were really in contrast with his poor and fragile physique." [60] For Titus, the issue was not so much one of political philosophy as it was of religion itself. Dutch Catholicism could never be a docile "state church". Free exercise of religion and its practical consequences brought him to direct conflict with the N.S.B., mainly because he felt that true Dutch and Frisian patriotism assured those things, things they wanted to curtail. He was impossible to control or manage. He was opposed to Nazi ideology in principle . Although he could deal very charitably with individual Nazis, he would make no compromises, no tradeoffs with their doctrine. And if it came to a question of life or death, he was quite willing to die. His death, among so many others, seems a clear triumph of human fidelity to timeless principles. If there is to be "meaning" seen in any of these deaths, it must certainly be found in this sphere. |
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